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The European Convention Method in Hindsight
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More or less concurrently, a motley array of books has been published about the European
Convention and the evolution of the constitutional treaty. In this essay on the European
Convention, I will use The Accidental Constitution by the British investigative journalist,
Peter Norman, mainly because it is an excellent work with an absorbing narrative and an
in-depth analysis of the French and British vision. Norman describes the areas of tension
with a blend of humour and detail, which keeps the reader turning the pages. Having
conducted countless interviews, Norman is a mine of information on what goes on in the
corridors of power (e.g., the Hilton dinners organised by Inigo Méndez de Vigo). He
turns the spotlight on largely unknown figures, such as Antonio Vitorino, Andrew Duff,
Alain Lamassoure (a one-man idea factory), Lamberto Dini and Johannes Voggenhuber.
Another publication on the same subject, but particularly useful for lawyers, is Konvent
zur Zukunft Europas by Austrian diplomat and academic Klemens H. Fischer. This book
offers a commentary (more of an analysis really) on the wording of the articles in the draft
Constitution for Europe and comes with a CD-Rom containing no fewer than 13,100
texts from the European Convention and the meetings of the European Council, which
are referred to in the footnotes. Each chapter is elaborated with quotations taken from
Churchill. One useful aspect is that the analysis contains many (cross-) references to other
relevant articles in the constitutional treaty.
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Another worthwhile book for lawyers is Vers une Constitution européenne by Etienne de
Poncins, French diplomat and member of the Secretariat of the European Convention.
The commentary in this book is preceded by a 40-page introduction and tables and lists of
the names of the European Convention members. The analysis of the articles in the draft
constitution is somewhat sharper, a bit closer to the edge, than in Fischer’s book. Each
article is followed by a brief sketch of the core issue. The author addresses every topic,
which has been under discussion, even the incorrect translation of the quotation from
Thycidides – a colossal faux pas which has continued to haunt the intergovernmental
conference (De Poncins, p. 77). What is missing in this book is commentary on the con-
stitutional rights, which form the second part of the treaty. The reader can, however, find
this in the book by Fischer (p. 197-242).
In La Constitution pour l’Europe, ‘founding father’ Valéry Giscard d’Estaing presents
his own vision of the European Constitution in 77 clear and concise pages, followed by all
the draft articles. It is interesting to see how much of the text – including the preamble –
is traceable to political compromises. Though edifying, La Constitution pour l’Europe fails
to reflect critically on the final opus of the European Convention (probably for political
reasons, as the Treaty was still to be signed) and offers no insight into Giscard’s relations
with figures like Dehaene and Amato or influential heads of government like Blair (not
even during the talks at 10 Downing Street). There is a little more critical reflection in De
Europese uitdaging: Van uitbreiding tot integratie by Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-President of
the European Convention and former Prime-Minister of Belgium. Dehaene provides a
valuable chronicle of the European Convention, but he too is sparing in his assessment of
people; this is unfortunate as his criticism of Prodi and Berlusconi and his relationship
with Giscard d’Estaing merit further elaboration. At the end of the book Dehaene pre-
sents a federalist vision of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, drawing attention to
its absence at critical moments. He feels it would have been better to speak of ‘joint action’
in the second pillar. When the European Constitution comes into effect, the Common
Foreign and Security Policy will fall within the competence of the Union (and will no
longer be just a question of co-ordinating intergovernmental competencies), though it
will not come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (III-376 Constitution for
Europe). Dehaene envisages an EU which is a ‘global player’, has a seat on the Security
Council and speaks with one voice. It is an idealistic vision and an inspiration for federal-
ists. An intriguing Freudian slip appears in the footnotes, when Dehaene refers to Norman’s
book as The Accidental ‘Convention’ (Dehaene, p. 232, n. 44).
It was patently clear that the accession of ten new states in 2004 – marking the reunifica-
tion of Europe after fifty years of the east-west divide – would have profound implications
for the organisation and political image of the European Union. Free movement of per-
sons and goods in such a wide area was bound to usher in new opportunities and respon-
sibilities. After reunification, Germany was prepared to exchange its strong mark for the
EURO, but did anyone fully realise that enlargement would upset the population balance
between large and small states? The partially unsuccessful negotiations around the Treaty
of Amsterdam (1997) showed that the heads of government were nowhere near readiness
to set up the new Europe. Scarcely any progress was made regarding decisions by qualified
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majority, the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers or the composition of the
European Commission. The threat of a large and unwieldy European Commission was
still hovering. The later attempt at institutional reform in Nice (2000) also turned into a
trade-off. In the weighting of votes, population size played no role between Germany and
France and a somewhat arbitrary role between the Netherlands and Belgium (Giscard
d’Estaing, p. 11; Dehaene, p. 23).
The process leading to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the same year was,
however, a success. This took place via a Convention (from December 1999), comprising
not only government representatives but also parliamentarians from the member states
and delegates from the European Parliament and the Commission – in other words, elected
representatives, who were more politically focused than diplomats. Could the Charter of
Fundamental Rights at the regional level close the gap between human rights and popular
sovereignty, enhancing transparency and the legal certainty of the citizens of Europe? Under
the leadership of Roman Herzog, the Charter was drawn up in legal form and could, as
such, have been directly incorporated in the Treaty – though it was clear from the start
that it would not become binding during the European Council Summit in Nice (Decem-
ber 2000). Though initially presented as no more than a codifier, the first Convention
turned out to be much more creative than anyone had expected; in fact, it was a concrete
source of inspiration – on a par with the American Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 –
for the second European Convention (De Poncins, p. 11). The Charter of Fundamental
Rights could also be seen as a stronger basis for the external policy of the EU.
Joska Fischer’s lecture at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000 – ‘skil-
fully timed, and lifting the debate to a new level’ (Norman, p. 12) – also formed a source
of inspiration for the development of a European Constitution. In 2001 the Declaration
of Laeken came into being under the Belgian Presidency and, even then, with involvement
by Jean-Luc Dehaene and Giuliano Amato. The aim was to create a more democratic,
transparent and efficient Europe, which would, at the same time, bring stability in the
new, multi-polar world. Several points raised by Joschka Fischer, Tony Blair and Jacques
Chirac were also addressed (Norman, p. 19). The agenda should cover more than just the
four issues of the Nice Summit: a more precise delineation of powers between the EU and
the member states in line with the subsidiarity principle, the status of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, simplification of the treaties without changing their content, and
the role of the national parliaments. The social partners, the NGOs and the academic
community should be explicitly involved in the operations of the European Convention;
in short, a bottom-up approach. Dehaene managed to save the NGOs from reliving the
disillusionment of the First Convention by involving them across the board in the activi-
ties (Dehaene, p. 71). The Declaration of Laeken raised a series of sometimes confusing
questions for the European Convention (Norman, p. 21). This is where the path towards
the European Convention began, led by Giscard d’Estaing, who had been appointed Presi-
dent by the European Council, with the lawyer Amato and the experienced negotiator
(also with NGOs) Dehaene as Vice-Presidents. According to Norman, they proved a very
effective team.
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Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1926), former French President and founder of the Euro-
pean Council in the 1970s, was a man of experience, authority and great charisma. He was
the only member of the Convention who had fought in WWII. Giscard wanted small
conference rooms with a wide distinction between ‘les conventionnels’ and support work-
ers. He wanted to develop an esprit de corps among the members and was not afraid to
make salary and accommodation demands in the interest of the Convention. In short, he
was a person who commanded respect. One of his greatest gifts was his sense of timing,
both in dividing the Convention into phases (starting with the listening phase) and in
chairing meetings, setting agendas and seeking publicity, a case in point being the post-
ponement of the start of the European Convention from the scheduled date of Friday 1
March 2002 to the more media-friendly date of 28 February 2002 (Norman, p. 42). Like
a dedicated centre forward, Giscard was prepared to go it alone, if necessary. When meet-
ings lasted too long, he simply got up and left and, says Dehaene (p. 95), sometimes the
meetings were more productive and exciting because of this. Giscard d’Estaing was a skil-
ful politician, who made sure that the scoops were always for the European Convention
and not for the European Council or the European Commission. He maintains that it is
pointless to compare the future Europe directly with the USA (assimilation by a common
language); Europe will have to work things out for itself (Giscard d’Estaing, p. 19). Re-
gional devolution of internal and economic policy and the co-ordination of foreign policy
need to be bolstered in the EU, but not without due respect for the national sovereignty of
the larger members in particular (Germany, France, the UK, Spain and Poland, collec-
tively accounting for 75% of the EU population). Giscard d’Estaing makes no bones
about this in his book. He sees the European Union as based on the dual nature of its
citizens and states, but the importance he attaches to equality between EU citizens places
the larger states at an advantage on the basis of population size (Giscard d’Estaing, p. 24,
73). And, because of its external relations and joint defence, Europe needs leadership and
a phone number. This is why Giscard d’Estaing was in favour of the idea of a European
President and – in a cumbersome construction – an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs who
would be appointed by the European Council but who, as Vice-President of the European
Commission, would still need endorsement by the European Parliament.
In his first ‘skeleton’ for a new Constitution in October 2002, Giscard d’Estaing used,
for pedagogic reasons, the phrase ‘administer certain competences on a “federal” basis’,
but had to withdraw this later because the UK, the northern states and Eastern Europe did
not take kindly to the ‘F word’. The incident was enormously hyped up by the media and,
by making a blatant concession together with Blair, Giscard d’Estaing shrewdly managed
to keep British populism under control (Giscard d’Estaing, p. 34): the Union acts on the
basis of competences conferred by member states. The possibility of seceding from the
Union was also set out. On 22 April 2003, Giscard d’Estaing – provocatively – referred to
the European Council as ‘the highest institution in the Union’ (see Norman, p. 343-349).
Two days later, he watered this down a bit. All the same, he did strengthen the position of
the European Council as the second institution, and a permanent president is also on the
cards (Giscard d’Estaing, p. 54-58). It was entirely characteristic of Giscard d’Estaing to
produce that Chinese tortoise to illustrate the proverb ‘more hurry, less speed’, but it did
not mean that he was not worried about finishing the job (Giscard d’Estaing, p. 14).
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Splitting the Convention into phases – with the institutional issues at the end – was part
of his master plan (Fischer, p. 47), but there was no alternative than to working within the
timescale imposed by the European Council. The aim was to present a document at the
Council meeting in Thessaloniki at the end of June 2003. In July 2002 Giscard d’Estaing
announced that it was the Convention’s ambition to produce texts which would lead to
consensus – so no options – in order to exert maximum influence at the intergovernmen-
tal conference. This approach was much broader (and some thought, formally, even a bit
dubious) than in the Declaration of Laeken (Fischer, p. 31). The administrative set-up
needed reorganisation. Transparency was needed about the fundamental principals under-
lying the exercise of government powers, at the same time raising the issue of limited
government. Hence, the fundamental rights would be indispensable. The intention was
clearly to come up with a document that the European Council in Thessaloniki could not
ignore (Dehaene, p. 78-79, 145). In the period between 28 February 2002 and July 2003,
this European Convention succeeded in drawing up a draft treaty establishing a constitu-
tion for Europe. It consisted of an amalgamation and rearrangement of existing treaties in
the hope of arriving at a coherent and transparent whole – for EU citizens as well. Eventu-
ally, the intergovernmental conference, after failed attempts by the Italian presidency
(Dehaene, p. 149), approved the Constitution for Europe in a new Treaty of Rome (18
June 2004; CiG 87/04, 6 August 2004). Now it is time for domestic parliamentary and
public approval procedures.
What conclusions can be drawn from working with a European Convention? All the
authors stress that a crucial role was reserved for the presidium, which came together
almost every week and presented the texts to the meeting, after which the members sub-
mitted thousands of amendments. Under the presidium was a secretariat – the power-
house of the Convention – consisting of experienced writers of treaties, headed by Sir
John Kerr from the UK, a skilled diplomat, and the Italian Annalisa Gianella. Giscard
d’Estaing described Kerr as one of the most brilliant men he ever met (Norman, p. 38).
Kerr’s influence and the assertiveness of the British representatives, Hain and Scotland,
prompted some countries (France and Germany) to send more heavyweight delegates.
This resulted in the so-called ‘invasion of foreign ministers’ and was an indirect endorse-
ment of the success of Giscard d’Estaing’s strategy. Relations in the presidium were har-
monious. No national standpoints were allowed. The meetings did, however, take place
behind closed doors (Norman, p. 4). Interestingly, the two representatives of the Euro-
pean Commission, Barnier and Vitorino, were given very little room to manoeuvre by
their boss. Giscard d’Estaing was furious at Commission President Prodi for allowing the
Commission’s own draft treaty – code named Penelope and an influential document in
terms of content – to leak out, an incident which hardly demonstrated respect for the
work of the Convention.
The working groups (each with approximately 30 members) under the chairmanship
of a presidium member proved successful. This applies especially to the group on the legal
status of the Union – encompassing, in effect, the amalgamation of the treaties and the
integration of the European Communities and European Union (De Poncins, p. 93) – but
also to the group on the integration of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
Treaty and the relationship with the national Parliaments (essentially a national problem,
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but national Parliaments were allowed to present a yellow card if they believed that Euro-
pean legislative proposals were in breach of the subsidiarity principle) (Fischer, p. 19).
Compromises were reached in these working groups, which were later accepted by the
entire Convention. Dehaene says (p. 69): ‘People sometimes commented that they were
amazed that I could listen to these expositions for hours on end, but my answer was
simple: I found it riveting’. Much to the displeasure of the Commission, which prefers to
work with objectives, the European Convention distinguished between exclusive
competences, shared competences and areas of supporting, co-ordinating or complemen-
tary action in the Union (Art. I-12, I-13, I-14, I-17 Constitution for Europe). The clause
in Article 308 EC was extended to cover the entire sphere of action of the Union.
One positive development is that the candidate states could participate fully in the
talks and under the same conditions as the member states, i.e., they sent a government
representative and two members of Parliament. They could not, however, block a possible
consensus between the member states. Another auspicious sign was that these states (fur-
nishing 39 of the 105 members of the European Convention) did not unite in a separate
group, not even at the later intergovernmental conference. It was a tremendous learning
experience for most of them (De Poncins, p. 23). The candidate states had to battle it out
for a place in the presidium (Norman, p. 43). The European Convention, with members
drawn from the European Parliament and the European Commission, was much more
European than the average intergovernmental conference. The meetings were public and
the documents were posted on a website. It was not a parliament where everyone had a
vote. Eventually, the European Convention took decisions on the basis of a broad consen-
sus – not unanimity – which was more of an unspecified large majority, always deter-
mined by the Convention President alone (Norman, p. 46). Co-operation grew quickly
between the members of the European Parliament and the national Parliaments. The po-
litical parties took care of the horizontal ties in the ranks of the Convention and came with
collective policy documents or amendments. When, towards the end of the Convention,
some heads of government (from the smaller states in particular who formed a front with
Spain and Poland and demanded strict equality for all member states, no permanent presi-
dent, and one commissioner for each state) started causing a fuss about institutional is-
sues, the parliamentarians closed ranks. Compromises were proposed: the option of
commissioners without voting rights and a permanent president with very limited powers
(based on consensus in the Convention in June 2003) were laid on the table. At long last,
Giscard d’Estaing was able to present a draft treaty in Thessaloniki. He was given an extra
month to sort out the details in the third part.
The Convention deliberately chose to address the institutional issues at a relatively late
stage because by that time consensus on earlier issues would have created a sense of soli-
darity. Meanwhile, the heads of government were speculating about a permanent presi-
dent, and Giscard d’Estaing spoke about his – ultimately unachievable – Congress of the
Peoples of Europe, which would consist of national and European members of Parliament
and form the future electoral congress for the President of the European Council. Many
smaller member states were demanding one commissioner per state. Norman provides an
enlightening account of the tensions between the large and small member states. The
Belgian Prime-Minister Guy Verhofstadt was the first Benelux premier to cease opposi-
tion to the idea of a permanent president. Dehaene hints that Belgium’s unremitting pro-
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European stance was partly motivated by economic considerations: ‘The Flemish industry
sites are full of foreign companies which have settled in Belgium because of the common
market’ (Dehaene, p. 160).
Dehaene concludes that the mission of Laeken was more or less a success. He claims
that the ambitious Constitution will make the EU more democratic and transparent, but
these are just two of the three objectives (Dehaene, p. 113). Whether it will improve
efficiency is open to question, because decision-making by a qualified majority has not
been fully realised. There is, however, more clarity about the procedure. Decisions must
be approved by a majority of member states, together representing 65 % of the popula-
tion. The Commission will still be too big – at least until 2009. There are too many euro-
parliamentarians and conflicts will probably arise between the President of the Commission
and the European Council and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. De Poncins offers
some useful suggestions, recommending a Commission President in his or her forties with
an economic background and a Council President aged around 65 with a cultural back-
ground (De Poncins, p. 140). It would be sensible to pursue a cautious personnel policy in
this area in particular: ‘In the long run it is the individuals who make the institutions’
(Dehaene, p. 167).
It cannot be denied that, under Giscard d’Estaing’s leadership, the European Conven-
tion delivered an outstanding achievement. Meanwhile, the introduction of the EURO
on 1 January 2002 coupled with external pressure after 11 September 2001 and subse-
quent terrorist actions have triggered a ‘sense of urgency’ among the European heads of
government. All the authors implicitly suggest that the work carried out by the European
Convention has considerably strengthened the political legitimacy of the European Union.
They may well be right on that count, but not everyone will agree with Giscard d’Estaing’s
conclusion that the European Constitution makes everything clearer for the citizen (Giscard
d’Estaing, p. 76-77).
In keeping with the spirit of the Declaration of Laeken (December 2001), the Euro-
pean Convention wanted to simplify the treaties and reorganise them into a constitutional
text, though it could have concentrated on retaining the existing texts – also a feasible
option. It is in itself strange that it is now just as difficult formally to amend the third part,
i.e., apart from a bridging clause or suchlike (Norman, p. 284) as the first two.
It is debatable whether the present product with hundreds of articles was actually what
the authors of the Declaration of Laeken had in mind. That is, assuming the intention was
really for the Constitution ‘to find a place in people’s hearts’ and to be ‘a constitution that
the average secondary school child could take to heart’ (Norman, p. 6, 67). For example,
were the members of the European Family not entitled, perhaps on the basis of the doc-
trine of power sharing, to a somewhat leaner Constitution? None of the books really
tackles this question, though Norman does say that Sir John Kerr was initially in favour of
a leaner constitution (p. 63). By reformulating all the existing treaties, the new constitu-
tional treaty has also led to complex referenda. As a referendum requires either a straight
‘yes’ or ‘no’, Dehaene sees it as a totally unsuitable tool for closing the democratic gap
between the government and the citizens. It looks as if not just the citizens but also the
governments responsible for this Constitutional Treaty can gird their loins.
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